青年经济学者论坛
第13期
报告主题
Bundled Procurement for Technology Acquisition
and Future Competition
报告人：朱 阳 副教授
Marshall School of Business,
University of Southern California
主持人：杨 念 助理教授
南京大学经济学院金融与保险学系
时 间：2014年4月17日（周四）15:00
地 点：安中楼 302
南京大学经济学院
ABSTRACT: We study a procurement mechanism that bundles the project
procurement with the technology acquisition for a buyer who aims to compete
with current suppliers in the future. We propose a dynamic game theoretic
model that analyzes the optimal technology offers of the asymmetric suppliers
and highlights how the relative size of the current project and the supplier
competition determine the effectiveness of the bundled procurement mechanism.
Under the two-supplier case, we find that each supplier has a dominant
technology offer strategy that is independent of the opponent's technology
offer strategy. When the size of the procurement project is small, the
suppliers only offer obsolete technologies even if the suppliers are perfect
substitutes. While suppliers offer better technologies as the size increases,
the suppliers' technology offers are not continuous with respect to the size.
Once the size reaches some threshold, the supplier’s optimal response jumps
and the best technology will be offered. We find that a relative size of 5% to
10% is sufficient for the suppliers to offer the best technologies under
reasonable market conditions. When the suppliers offer their best technologies
, the premium for technology transfer is relatively small compared to the
profit from the future market.
Leon Yang Zhu is an Associate Professor of Data Sciences and Operations
Management at Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California.
Leon’s research interests include contract and market mechanism design, game
theory, and applied optimization. Leon’s papers have been published in the
American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Management Science,
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Operations Research, and Rand
Journal of Economics.